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COPY
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Clifton W. PANOS,
Petitioner/Plaintiff,
vs.
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT of Tooele County,

Case No. 20030344-SC

and
The Hon. Randall N. SKANCHY,
Respondents,
and Jennifer Ann CASTLE,
Real Party in Interest/
Defendant.

ADDENDUM TO REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON REHEARINC
ON GRANT OF REHEARING ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION AND/OR MANDAMUS DIRECTING THAT RESPONDENT DISTRICT COURT AND JUDGE LACK JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS
SMALL CLAIMS ACTION ON APPEAL IN TRIAL DE NOVO, AND
FURTHER REQUIRING THAT APPEALED CAUSE BE DISMISSED

Brent M. Johnson, General Counsel to
the Administrative Office of the Courts
and Attorney for the Respondents
450 S. State Street, Suite N31
P. O. Box 140241
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0241

Paul H. Matthews & Associates, P.C.
Counsel to Real Party in Interest/Defendant
10 W. Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2060

Clifton W. PANOS pro se
Petitioner and Plaintiff
996 Oak Hills Way
Salt Lake City, UT
84108-2022
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Exhibit "A"

PAUL H. MATTHEWS & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
10 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 -2060
Telephone: (801) 355-7007
Facsimile: (801) 355-6006

February 12,2003
Third District Court
Tooele County,
Small Claims Department
47 South Main #141
Tooele, Utah 84074
RE:

Panos v. Castle
Civil No. 02-31
OurFiIeNo.Allied-413

Dear Clerk of the Court:
Pleasefilethe enclosed original:
1.

NOTICE OF APPEAL.

b*

*3

QO

od

Please also find enclosed our check in the amount of $70.00 for the appeal. Please return
your receipt in the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope.
Very truly yours,
PAUL H. MATTHEWS & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

Richard N.Barnes
RNB:jbl
Enclosures
Letter to Court Ol.wpd

Exhibit "B"

Paul H. Matthews (#2122)
Richard N. Barnes (#8892)
W. Kevin Tanner (#8872)
PAUL H. MATTHEWS & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
10 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2060
Telephone: (801) 355-7007
Facsimile: (801) 355-6006
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
TOOELE COUNTY, SMALL CLAIMS DEPARTMENT
47 South Main, Tooele, Utah 84074

CLIFTON W. PANOS,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

v.

Case No. 02-31

JENNIFER ANN CASTLE,
Defendant.

Defendant appeals to the District Court thefinaljudgment entered in this case by Judge
William E. Pitt of this court.
DATED this il^d&y of February, 2003.
PAUL H. MATTHEWS & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

/7/
Paul H. Matthews
Richard N. Barnes
W. Kevin Tanner
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

|jA day of February, 2003,1 caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be mailed through United States mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Clifton W. Panos
996 Oakhill Way
Salt Lake City, UT 84108
Planitiff

t ^iljA
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Exhibit "C"

A.L.R. — Right of independent expert w
refuse to testify as to expert opinion, 50
A.L.R.4th 680.
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal
case to assistance of expert in social attitudes,
74 A.L.R.4th 330.
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal
case to assistance of chemist, toxicologist, tech-

specialist in substance analysis, 74 A.L.R.4th
388.
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal
prosecution to ex parte in camera hearing on
request for state-funded expert witness, 83
AL.R.5th 541.

ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY
Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(d)(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the
statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness
denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or
(d)(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a
party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a
representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested
an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by
the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency
or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection
(a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971).
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices
and machines, e.g., radar. The definition of
"hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially the
same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971).
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Rule 63(1),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates from
the federal rule in that it allows use of prior
statements as substantive evidence if (1) inconsistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and
does not require the prior statement to have
been given under oath or subject to perjury. The
former Utah rules admitted such statements as
an exception to the hearsay rule. See California
-

onn n o
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Subdivision (d)(1) is as originally promulgated
by the United States Supreme Court with the
addition of the language "or the witness denies
having made the statement or has forgotten"
and is in keeping with the prior Utah rule and
the actual effect on most juries.
Subdivision (d)(1)(B) is in substance the
same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its
interpretation of the applicable rule in this
general area. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310
P.2d 388 (1957).
Subdivision (d)(1)(C) comports with prior
Utah case law. State v. Owens, 15 Utah 2d 123,
388 P.2d 797 (1964); State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah
2d 277, 451 R2d 786 (1969).
The substance of subdivision (d)(2)(A) was
contained in Rules 63(6) and (7), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971), as an exception to the hearsay
rule.

Exhibit "D"

Paul H. Matthews (#2122)
Richard N. Barnes (#8892)
W.Kevin Tanner (#8872)
PAUL H. MATTHEWS & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
10 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2060
Telephone: (801) 355-7007
Facsimile: (801) 355-6006
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, TOOELE COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
47 South Maui, Tooele, Utah 84074

CLIFTON W. PANOS,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT

v.

Case No. 038300082 ST

JENNIFER ANN CASTLE,

Judge Randall Skanchy

Defendant.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
)ss.
STATE OF UTAH
)
I, Janet Layosa, having been duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years and am an individual residing in Salt Lake

County, Utah.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit.

3.

On February 12, 2003 I called the Tooele Justice Court directly and spoke to a

Justice Court Clerk.
4.

I specifically asked the Justice Court Clerk what the appropriate filing fee was for

an appeal from a Justice Court small Claim's decision that is the subject matter of the present
lawsuit.
5.

I was informed that the filing fee would be $70.00 and that I should forward a

check in that amount with the Notice of Appeal filed in the present matter.
6.

I was not told by the Justice Court Clerk of any additional fees to this $70.00.

7.

Acting in reliance on the statements made by the Justice Court Clerk, I requested

a check in the amount of $70.00 which was attached to the letter from Richard Barnes in his
letter transmitting the Notice of Appeal to the Justice Court.
Further saith naught your affiant.
DATED this J ? day of February, 2003.

pf

T+dt'

Janet
STATE OF UTAH

)

:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this £1 day of February, 2003.

OAJJL.

OjU^L
otary Public
My Commission Expires: /V\)A\ ^r\

^co^
«i* &&• HWR *t<n*i «s*t (sse** sassaa oasnt sessa exes* SEHS tsar

Notary Public
LAURIC. PARKE

...%
^»
I \°V QSS^iP Jsl
1 \&Wipr$y
. N^TKf^

10 West Broadway, Suite 750
V' U t a h 84101-2046
My Commission Expires
April 27,2005
state

S a l t L a k e Clt

L ^T*r-- ~-

of Utah

Exhibit "E"

CASE NUMBER 038300082 SC denovo Justice
PROCEEDINGS
0 2 - 1 3 •03 Case f i l e d by n e v a g
0 2 - 1 3 •03 J u d g e SKANCHY a s s i g n e d .
0 2 - 1 3 •03 PRETRIAL CONF ON SC APPEAL JC s c h e d u l e d on March 03 2003 a t
01:30 PM in Room 321 with Judge SKANCHY.
0 2 - 1 3 -03 Note: Address changed from
0 2 - 1 3 •03 Note: Address changed to 1947 North 40 West Tooele UT 84074
0 2 - 1 3 •03 Note: Address changed from
0 2 - 1 3 •03 Note: Address changed to 996 Oak Hills Way Tooele UT 84074
0 2 - 1 3 •03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 038300082 ID 5516736
PRETRIAL CONF ON SC APPEAL JC.
Date: 3/3/03
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Room 321
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
47 SOUTH MAIN
TOOELE, UT 84 074
Before Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY
The reason for the change is Clerk error.
02-13- -03 PRETRIAL CONF ON SC APPEAL JC scheduled on March 03, 2003 at
01:30 PM in Room 321 with Judge SKANCHY.
0 2 - 1 3 - •03 PRETRIAL CONF ON SC APPEAL JC Cancelled.
0 2 - 1 3 - •03 Filed: Trial De Novo on Appeal from Justice Court
Total Due:
70.00
0 2 - 1 3 - •03 Fee Account created
0 2 - 1 3 - •03 TRIAL DE NOVO
Payment Received:
70.00
Note: Code Description: TRIAL DE NOVO; Mail Payment;
0 2 - 1 3 - •03 Filed: Notice of Appeal, Justice Court #02-31
02-19- •03 Filed File from Justice Court received
02-19- •03 Filed Faxed letter from Richard Barnes re: conversation with
clerk on 2-18-03 .
0 2 - 2 0 - •03 Fee Account created
Total Due:
3.50
0 2 - 2 0 - •03 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
3.50
0 2 - 2 0 - 03 Note: Address changed from 996 Oak Hills Way Tooele UT 84074
0 2 - 2 0 - 03 Note: Address changed to 996 Oak Hills Way
Salt Lake City UT
84108
0 2 - 2 0 - 03 Note: Plaintiff came in and received a copy of the notice for
hearing on 3-3-03.
0 2 - 2 0 - 0 3 Filed: Letter of Notice of Hearing on 3-3-03 (to plaintiff)
returned to court. Address is wrong.
0 2 - 2 0 - 03 Filed Letter from Richard Barnes (original)
0 2 - 2 4 - 03 Filed Request for Continuance (PLA)
0 2 - 2 4 - 03 Filed Motion to Dismiss Appeal (Clifton Panos)
0 2 - 2 4 - 03 Filed
Supplement to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal
0 2 - 2 6 - 03 PRETRIAL ON SC TRIAL DE NOVO scheduled on March 03, 2003 at
01:30 PM in Room 321 with Judge SKANCHY.
0 2 - 2 6 - 03 PRETRIAL CONF ON SC APPEAL JC Cancelled.
0 2 - 2 7 - 03 Filed: Copy of letter from attorney for defendant to Justice
Court.

Printed: 04/14/03 13:51:22
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\SE NUMBER 038300082 SC denovo Justice
2-27-03 Filed: Letter to Court from plaintiff dated 2-27-03
nevag
1-28-03 Note: On 2-27-03, after learning that Judge Skanchy had
approved the request for continuance filed by Mr. Panos, I
called both parties to notify them that the hearing would be
cancelled for 3-3-03 and that they would be given notice of the
reset date.
nevag
-28-03 PRETRIAL ON SC TRIAL DE NOVO Cancelled.
-28-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 038300082 ID 5531253
nevag
PTC/MOTION TO DISMISS is scheduled.
Date: 03/17/2003
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Room 321
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
4 7 SOUTH MAIN
TOOELE, UT 84074
Before Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY
-28-03 PTC/MOTION TO DISMISS scheduled on March 17, 2003 at 01:30 PM
in Room 321 with Judge SKANCHY.
nevag
-28-03 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
lucilleh
Dismiss Appeal
nevag
-11-03 Filed: Request for Continuance (Clifton W. Panos)
-12-03 Note: Mr. Panos filed a Request for Continuance of 3-17-03
hearing. Per RNS, if both parties stipulate in writing, the
continuance may be granted
nevag
17-03 Filed: Letter from Mr. Panos with attachment, faxed.
nevag
17-03 Filed: Letter from Mr. Panos, original, with attachment.
nevag
17-03 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision
j uliek
17-03 TRIAL DE NOVO scheduled on April 08, 2003 at 09:00 AM in Room
tawnil
321 with Judge SKANCHY.
tawnil
17-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for PTC/ MOTION TO DISMISS
Judge:
RANDALL SKANCHY
Clerk:
tawnil
PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): CLIFTON PANOS
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARD N BARNES
Video
Tape Number:
2003-017
Tape Count: 3:21

HEARING
This matter comes now before the court for pretrial on trial de
novo and for hearing on plaintiff's motion to dismiss appeal.
The Court having heard argument from respective parties, denies
the motion to dismiss the appeal. Trial de novo is set for 4-8-03
at 9:00 am.
The parties are aware that this matter is double-set,
and they are to keep in contact with this court.

Lted: 04/14/03 13:51:27
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3RD DISTRICT COUKT - iwjmii w « m
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLIFTON PANOS,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF
PTC/MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

Case No: 038300082 ST

JENNIFER ANN CASTLE,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

RANDALL SKANCHY
February 28,2003

PTC/MOTION TO DISMISS is scheduled.
Date: 03/17/2003
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Room 321
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
47 SOUTH MAIN
TOOELE, UT 84074
Before Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY
Dated this

, 20_£^_.

day of J^.

District Court Deputy Clerk
IF YOU NEED AN INTERPRETER, PLEASE NOTIFY THE COURT at(five days
before your hearing, if possible). In all criminal cases and in
some other proceedings, the court will arrange for the interpreter
and will pay the interpreter's fees. You must use an interpreter
from the list provided by the court.
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act# individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Julie Kroff
at 435-843-4713 at least three working days prior to the
proceeding.

Wnrtr Bfetrid Court
Tooele County Courthouse
17 South Main
fooele, Utah 84074
\ddress Service Requested

qqio 0JL

iUii UJy

Exhibit "G"

Fax Transmission (No. of pages: 7)
Li

To: The Hon. Randall N. Skanchy

~ - *-

Third District Court. Tooele County

47 S. Main Street, Room 3 2 1 , Tooele, UT
Fox no.: (435) 843-3210

- » . r ic r C O L ? n T

84Q74-2f3T m *Afrctyp.fr 688300082 ST

Telephone: (435) 882-85E#

Date: March 1 5 t h , 2001

From: Clifton W. Panos, 996 Oak Hills Way, Salt Lake City, Utah
84108-2022
Tele: (801) 582-0645
E-mail: clifpanos@yahoo.com

Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 Does Mot Apply to Small Claims
Code of Judicial Administration 4-803(H) specifically enjoins:
"The trial de novo [and any pretrial proceedings pertaining to it]
shall be tried in accordance with the procedures of small claims
actions."
Your Honor:
Respecting the above-referenced case, today via mail I received from
opposing counsel a Notice to Submit for Decision (copy appended hereto).
This seems t o indicate a reliance upon Judicial Administration Rule 4 - 5 0 1 ,
which does not apply in this matter.
(Refer to provision of said rule
indicated with circling in copy thereof hereafter annexed.)
It was for this
reason that I did not file a Notice to Submit for Decision with the Court
myself, nor file a written request for a hearing with my principal
memorandum in support of Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
However, since adverse counsel has invoked the Court per C.J.A. 4 - 5 0 1 ,
I, while not constrained per se by such, to some extent follow its precepts
by herewith petitioning the Court for a hearing on the motion at this time.
Also, I did not file a reply memorandum to Defendant's memorandum in
opposition because my construing of Rule 6 of Small Claims Procedure was
that I could make such a reply orally at the time of trial.
If I was incorrect
in this assessment, I would ask the Court to accept this communication as a
motion to enlarge the time for filing said reply pursuant to Rule 6(b) of Civil
Procedure.
Finally, Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 (3)(G)'s provision "Alldispositive
motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date" does not
comport with Small Claims Rule 6(b)'s directive "No motions will be heard prior to
trial".
However, if a pretrial hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal
can be stipulated to. I so do, t r u s t i n g - i f « W f « ^ a l w p r s \ counsel and the
Court itself are similarly amenable.
Most respectfully,
copy to: Richard N. Barnes, counsel for Ddfmii|u«A i-jy U Lliti^ Clifton W. Panos
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In re ZELLA M. HERREN, Debtor.
Case No. 91-01044-A CHAPTER 7
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING
138 B.R. 9 8 9 ; 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 548; 22 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1334

April 8, 1992, Decided
April 9, 1992, Filed and Entered
JUDGES: [ * * 1 ]

Mai

O P I N I O N B Y : BY THE COURT; HAROLD L. MAI
O P I N I O N : [*990] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
THIS MATTER came before the court on March 1 1 , 1992, for hearing on the United States Trustee's Objection
to Fee paid to an entity called Wyoming Document Center. Paul Hunter appeared for the United States
Trustee and Larry T. Ralls, Sr., appeared on behalf of the Wyoming Document Center.
The court having considered the Motion, the statements and arguments of counsel and of Mr. Ralls, the
exhibits, and being fully advised upon its own review of the applicable statutes and authorities, does hereby
find and conclude as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Wyoming Document Center is a business located in Lander, Wyoming. Mr. Larry T. Ralls, Sr., is the
President and General Manager of the business. At the bottom of the Document Center's stationery is the
following statement: "Owned and Operated by Big Sky Investments, Inc. - Lander, Wyoming."
2. Mr. Ralls is not an attorney and is not licenced to practice law in the State of Wyoming.
3. The business of the Document Center is to prepare legal documents. In order to obtain clients, it
advertises its services.
[ * 9 9 1 ] 4. The Document Center provides potential clients with a document [ * * 2 ]
AS A CITIZEN." This document advises the client as follows:

entitled "YOUR RIGHTS

* * * A highly paid army of persuaders surround us with thousands of seductive messages each day that all
say "buy, buy, buy". Credit that is readily available makes living beyond our means tempting as well as being
difficult to resist the siren sounds of the advertiser. We are also told that if we fail to pay for it right on time,
we are miserable deadbeats. * * *
God forsake, if for some just reason, such as illness, loss of work, a bad marriage, or just plain bad planning,
our ability to pay for the goods or services we need is interrupted. If this should happen our first feelings are
fear and guilt. We may even feel that we have fundamentally failed as human beings.
Nonsense, there is more to life than an A + credit rating and lots of better things to feel guilty about than the

dvismg of available exemptions from which to chose, defining terms in the schedules, directing what
roperty is appropriately listed in various areas, summarizing and reformulating the information solicited
"om clients, advising clients regarding responsibility to list all debts and the option of voluntary repayment
nd similar actions, all require exercise of legal judgment beyond the capacity [ * * 1 6 ] and knowledge of lay
•ersons. In re Anderson, 79 Bankr. 482, 485 (Bankr S.D. Cal. 1987); O'Connell v. David, 35 Bankr. at 144;
\achmann, 113 Bankr. at 772-3.
urther, the court finds and concludes that the Document Center's exhortation to "please don't delay . . .
our debt problem will not go away . . unless you act NOW", is itself giving legal advice. The unmistakable
md ordinary meaning of the "Dear future prospect letter" is (1) to advise that bankruptcy filing should not be
lelayed and (2) a representation that the client will thereby be rendered "absolutely debt-free, except for
lormal living expenses."
r

Such advice about the timing of an anticipated bankruptcy filing is a matter which requires legal expertise,
;ince from that date flows numerous consequences including the dischargeability of certain debts such as
student loans and taxes, entitlement to discharge, recoverability of preferences, and maximization of
exemptions.
Similarly, while the written materials offer the advice, indeed the promise, that by filing proper documents
:he client will become "absolutely" debt-free, this legal advice about the consequences [ * * 1 7 ] of filing is not
tempered with the unfortunate truth that many financial troubles arise from non-dischargeable debts.
Further, read as a whole, and in the context of inclusion in the packet of forms, the "Routine Bankruptcy
Procedure" document appears to advise the client what he or she can expect in their specific case and not
)ust provide general information regarding bankruptcy law. n2 It appears to assure the client that he or she
can expect a total "fresh start" and the case closed within three (3) to six (6) months. This completely
ignores the possibility of litigation over the dischargeability of debts or other frequent complications.
Footnotes

n2 E.g., It does not inform the clients that 341 Meetings are frequently continued to another date in which
case the debtor will again be required to appear. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2003(e).

E nc j Footnotes
Section 329(b) applies to all persons who render legal services to the debtor in connection with, or
contemplation of bankruptcy, including lay 'persons as well as lawyers. In re Grimes, 115 Bankr. 639, 649-50
(Bankr. D. S.D. 1990); [ * * 1 8 ] Bachmann, 113 Bankr at 775; In re Glad, 98 Bankr. 976, 978 (9th d r . BAP
1989) (solicitation of financial information used to prepare petition and schedules was "legal services"
rendered by nonattorney) r In re Fleet, 95 Bankr. 319, 338 [ * 9 9 6 ] (E.D. Pa. 1989) ("§ 329 provides court
with alternative, plenary authority to regulate, enjoin, and impose monetary sanctions against lay persons as
attorneys who bilk debtors in our court."); In re Telford, 36 Bankr. 92, 94 (9th Cir. BAP 1984).
The execution of a contract classifying or categorizing the services rendered as "legal scrivener," "legal
technician," or some similar t e r m , does not insulate the provider from liability under § 329 if, in fact, the
services are legal services. See In re Anderson, 79 Bankr. 482 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987). similarly, a contract
stating that the client understands that the services are not legal advice and are not provided by attorneys,
does not insulate a lay person who engages in the actual unauthorized practice of law Id
The actual typing involved in this case is minimal. In all cases in which a competent typist merely [ * * 1 9 ]
transcribes information filled out on official forms by the client, the time involved would be brief. If extra time
by a nonattorney is spent correcting, summarizing, or reformulating information provided by a client, that
time is spent on the unauthorized practice of law Bachmann, 113 Bankr at 774 Such time spent in the
unauthorized practice of law does not benefit a client.
Any business "overhead" for advertising that constitutes solicitation for the unauthorized practice of law is
similarly not a service which benefits a "pro se" debtor
In conclusion, it is clear that the respondent has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. As such, it is

24. Mr. Ralls specifically denies that he gave Ms. Herren legal advice. He does admit that she informed him
of her prior filing, but asserts that he didn't advise her regarding the second filing
25. Mr. Ralls represents that the Document Center's expenses for advertising, office overhead, and
paperwork, result in a profit of $ 40 out of each $ 300 fee.
26. After Ms. Herren filed her second Chapter 7 petition, Mr. Ralls sent letters to both the Office of the
United States Trustee and to Ms. Herren's Chapter 7 trustee asserting that he did not represent her and
never had.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157. This Objection to Fee is a
core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O).
Despite the vehement disclaimers and the repetitive initialing of the fee contract provisions, the exhibits
unquestionably establish that the Wyoming Document Center and its manager Big Sky Investments, Inc., are
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
It is an unauthorized practice of law to prepare legal instruments by which legal rights are secured. See State
ex rel Wyoming State Bar v. Hardy, 156 P.2d 309, 61 Wyo. 172 (Wyo. 1945). [ * * 1 3 ] A bankruptcy petition,
and the accompanying Statement of Affairs and Schedules, including the schedule of property claimed as
exempt, are indisputably legal instruments by which legal rights are secured.
Providing copies of the Official Forms necessary to filing a petition for bankruptcy relief is a legitimate and
necessary service to the public. Similarly, a typing service that consists of solely transcribing written
information furnished by clients is a service that may be legitimately provided by non-attorneys. In re
Bachmann, 113 Bankr. 769, 774 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990). Even the "sale of printed material purporting to
explain bankruptcy practice and procedure to the public" is permissible. Id,
Nonetheless, the respondent's conduct has far exceeded these acceptable practices. By its Definitions of
Schedules, and attached Blue Sheet, respondent has impermissibly provided specific direction as to the
correct way to fill out the forms, including what property to list where. "[Typing services] may not make
inquiries nor answer questions as to the completion of particular bankruptcy forms nor schedules nor answer
questions as to the completion of particular [ * * 1 4 ] bankruptcy forms or schedules nor advise how to best fill
out bankruptcy forms or schedules " Id.
"Actual preparation and direct or indirect filing for the debtor of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 petitions,
statements, schedules and Chapter 13 Plans" constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. O'Connell v.
David, 35 Bankr. 1 4 1 , 143 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) modified 35 Bankr. 146 (E.D. Pa 1983) a f f d 740 F.2d 958
(3rd Or. 1984).
The solicitation of financial information and preparation of schedules is rendering legal advice, whether
provided by lay persons or lawyers. In re Grimes, 115 Bankr. 639, 643 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1990).
In connection with preparing legal documents such as the schedules, providing [*995] clients with
definitions of such legal terms of art as "creditors holding secured claims," "real property," "executory
contracts," and the like is, by itself, giving legal advice.
Under the circumstances of this case, directing the client to "refer" to what appears to be a comprehensive
list of Wyoming exemptions from which the client is to select assets is, by itself, the unauthorized practice of
law. The only fair interpretation [ * * 1 5 ] of the referral to the provided list is that one Document Center is
advising the client of its opinion regarding available exemptions in Wyoming. It makes no difference whether
the Document Center's proffered legal advice was correct (occupancy necessary for homestead) or incorrect
(omission of retirement and vehicle exemption). Either way, it is still legal advice, complete with statutory
references.
The exhibits in this case establish that the Document Center solicited business on the basis that it had a
special expertise beyond that of a lay person ("it has to be done to perfection . . . it has to be immaculate
before a federal court will accept it
we feel you do need professional help . We will not leave your side
in preparing the current documents which are required by law.").
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In re: CHRISTINE KAITANGIAN, Debtor, Case No. 96-01692-B7; DIXIE R. HENRY, Debtor, Case No. 9606354-M7; CORRIE RUTH BAKER, Debtor, Case No. 96-07367-H7; CAROLYN A. CAMERA, Debtor, Case No.
96-09272-A7; SCOTT T. HANSEN and THERESA M. HANSEN, Debtors, Case No. 96-08789-M7; CHRISTINA M.
MCMARTIN, Debtor, Case No. 96-08788-A7; TILLIE SANCHEZ, Debtor, Case No. 96-07639-A7
Case No. 96-01692-B7, Case No. 96-06354-M7, Case No. 96-07367-H7, Case No. 96-09272-A7, Case No.
96-08789-M7, Case No. 96-08788-A7, Case No. 96-07639-A7
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
2 1 8 B.R. 1 0 2 ; 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 136; 39 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 860

January 23, 1998, Decided
January 23, 1998, Filed
COUNSEL: [ * * 1 ]

Christine Kaitangian, Debtor, Pro se, San Anselmo, CA.

Dixie R. Henry, Debtor, Pro se, Oceanslde, CA.
Corrie Ruth Baker, Debtor, Pro se, Oceanside, CA.
Carolyn A. Camera, Debtor, Pro se, Vista, CA.
Scott T. & Theresa M. Hansen, Debtors, Pro se, Oceanside, CA.
Christina M. McMartin, Debtor, Pro se, Oceanside, CA.
Tillie Sanchez, Debtor, Pro se, Oceanside, CA.
Trustee for Debtor Camera: Harold Taxel, Esq., La Jolla, CA.
Trustee for Debtor Sanchez: Gerald Davis, Esq., Coronado, CA.
Trustee for Debtors McMartin & T h e Hansens: Gregory Akers, Esq., San Diego, CA.
Trustee for Debtors Kaitangian, Henry & Baker: Ralph O. Boldt, Esq., San Diego, CA.
Ronald V. Filippone, Respondent, Pro se, Oceanside, CA.
Ronald V. Filippone, I I , Respondent, Pro se, Oceanside, CA.
Office of the United States Trustee: David A. Ortiz, Attorney, San Diego, CA.
JUDGES: JOHN J. HARGROVE, United States Bankruptcy Judge.
O P I N I O N B Y : JOHN J. HARGROVE
OPINION:

[ * 1 0 5 ] MEMORANDUM DECISION

»gal knowledge, training, skill, and ability beyond those possessed by the average layman." Id. at 547.
ccordmgly, the Court finds that the Fihppones' advice and explanations regarding differences between
hapter 7 and Chapter 13 of the Code constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
* 111] C ADVICE REGARDING REAFFIRMATION OF DEBTS.
IcMartm testified that Filippone explained to her the concept of "reaffirmation" of debts in reference to her
ar. Specifically, McMartin testified:
During my meeting [**21] with Mr. Filippone, he looked over the questionnaires and asked
what I wanted to do about the car. I told him I wanted to keep the car. He then told me that I
could re-affirm the debt and keep the car. I did not know what re-affirmmg a debt meant. So he
explained it to me.

ihppone then prepared the "Statement of Intention" for McMartin reaffirming her automobile debt.
aker testified that during the course of her meeting with Filippone I I , she told him that she wanted to keep
er van. She testified that Filippone II said that she could do that, but that she would have to reaffirm the
ebt and keep making the payments. Baker further testified that although she understood she had to reaffirm
ie debt to keep her van, she was not familiar with which Bankruptcy Code section dealt with reaffirmation
or did she tell Filippone to use a Bankruptcy Code section on the Statement of Intention. On redirect
xamination, Baker testified that she did not know what § 524 meant. Baker's Statement of Intention states:

)escription of Property
995 To/ota Previa LE/SC

Creditor's Name

Intention

Toyota Motor Credit Corp

Reaffirm 524(c)*

524(c)- Debt will be reaffirmed pursuant to Sec. 524(c).

**221
(though there is no direct testimony on point, the Court finds that when Baker signed her bankruptcy
leadings, including the Statement of Intention, the language regarding § 524 had been typed in by Filippone
[, or by employees of USPS who had been instructed to do so by Filippone I I .
mally, Hansen testified that after she had signed her bankruptcy pleadings and upon further review of the
onformed copies of the bankruptcy pleadings, she noticed a document entitled "Chapter 7 Debtor's
•tatement of Intention" which appeared to state that she and her husband had "reaffirmed" certain debts,
he further testified that she had never been advised about "reaffirmation" by Filippone I I , did not know what
meant, and had not prepared the "Statement of Intention."
n connection with preparing legal documents, such as the Statement of Intention, providing clients with
xplanations or definitions of such legal terms of art such as "reaffirmation" is, by itself, giving legal advice,
•ee Herren, 138 B.R at 995 (providing clients with definitions of legal terms of art is giving legal advice),
accordingly, the Court finds that the Fihppones and USPS have engaged in the unauthorized [**23] practice
f law by explaining to debtors the legal term "reaffirmation" as the term is used in § 524(c).
). ADVICE REGARDING THE TIMING OF FILING CHAPTER 7 PETITIONS.
lansen testified that she met with Filippone II and discussed the timing for filing her Chapter 7 petition,
lansen testified that she asked Filippone II whether it would be better to file a marital separation before or
fter the bankruptcy proceedings and that he told her that she should file bankruptcy first. The testimony is
inrebutted. The evidence also reflects that Hansen followed Filippone IFs advice and allowed USPS to file the
>ankruptcy prior to her marital separation petition
t is clear that Hansen not only sought Filippone II's advice, but relied on it as well. One court noted "such
idvice about the timing of an anticipated bankruptcy filing is a matter which requires legal expertise, since
rom that date flows numerous consequences [*112] including the dischargeability of certain debts such as
tudent loans and taxes, entitlement to discharge, recoverabihty of preferences, and maximization of
exemptions." Herren, 138 B.R. at 995. Furthermore, the interplay between the bankruptcy laws and the
nantal [**24] dissolution laws complicates these issues. Accordingly, the Court finds that Filippone II
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by giving advice to Hansen regarding whether she should file for

bankruptcy prior to filing for separation.
£ CLASSIFICATION OF DEBT.
McMartm testified that she did not know whether a debt on a house which she had previously owned with her
husband should be listed on her bankruptcy papers. She testified that as part of a divorce decree the house
was quitclaimed to her husband. McMartm testified that Filippone advised her "that by including the debt on
the house in my bankruptcy, I could 'sever my ties' with the house." McMartm also testified that prior to
meeting with Filippone she did not know what an unsecured debt was and where these debts should be listed
on her bankruptcy papers. She testified that Filippone "did that for me as well." Giving advice about whether
a debt is secured or unsecured requires legal expertise. In re Harris, 152 B.R. 440, 445 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1993). Accordingly, the Court finds that Fihppone's advice and recommendations to McMartm on how to
classify her debt constitute the unauthorized practice of law. [**25]
F. ADVICE REGARDING DISCHARGEABILITY OF STUDENT LOANS.
Baker testified that she discussed her student loan with Filippone and that he told her he did not believe it
would be discharged in her bankruptcy. The Court finds that advising debtors on dischargeability issues
constitutes the unauthorized practice of the law. Arthur, 15 B.R. at 547.
The above incidents were not isolated events. A course of conduct involving the unauthorized practice of law
by the Filippones was corroborated by Guyer. Guyer testified that as part of her agreement with Filippone,
she was provided with copies of a "customer questionnaire" to be used in the preparation of bankruptcy
cases. She testified that the questionnaire was not simply a blank copy of the bankruptcy petition, schedules,
Statement of Financial Affairs, and Statement of Intention. The questionnaire did not ask the debtors for
information necessary to fill out Schedule C (Exemptions), Schedule D (Secured Creditors), Schedule E
(Priority Creditors), Schedule F (Unsecured Creditors), Schedule G (Executory Contracts and Unexpired
Leases), or Schedule H (Co-Debtors). In addition, the questionnaire's "Financial Affairs" section did [**26]
not contain all the questions found in the official form "Statement of Financial Affairs."
Guyer further testified that her training included sitting in on debtor interviews with the Filippones. She
observed the Filippones solicit information from the debtors that was not included in the questionnaire. She
testified that Filippone would ask debtors whether they wanted to keep a credit card account and/or the
property purchased with a credit card or surrender the property. This information was then used to prepare
the "Statement of Intention." Guyer testified that during her training period, she also observed the Filippones
explain to prospective debtors the difference between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 The Court has previously
discussed Guyer's testimony regarding the Filippones' process of selecting exemptions for debtors.
Although the Filippones deny that they ever practiced law and testified about disclaimers given both orally
and in writing, the evidence contradicts these assertions. The Filippones had personal contact with the
debtors during which the Filippones explained forms, procedures and terms such as "reaffirmation," selected
exemptions, advised debtors on whether to file [**27] a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, and advised debtors on
the timing of their anticipated bankruptcy. The personal contact coupled with the explanations and advice rise
to a relationship of trust between the parties that is tantamount to that of an attorney-client. The Filippones
analyzed the factual information received on the debtors' questionnaires and from personal interviews. The
Filippones then exercised legal judgment in making various decisions for the debtors as set forth above.
Given the [*113] extent of the personal contact, advice and counseling, it is apparent that a relationship of
trust and confidence developed between the parties with the debtors trusting that the Filippones would
prepare their bankruptcy petitions and related pleadings correctly. See Landlords' Professional Services, 215
Cal. App 3d at 1599 (court found personal contact was a key factor in finding defendant engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law). n l 3
Footnotes

n l 3 The court in Landlords Professional Services reviewed similar cases in other jurisdictions. For example, in
Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Ore. 552, 538 P 2d 913 (1975) the court concluded that it was not an
unauthorized practice of law to advertise and sell divorce kits so long as the service had no personal contact
with a client. In New York Lawyers' Assn. v. Dacey, 21 N.Y.2d 694, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422
(1967), the court found sale of Norman F. Dacey's book "How To Avoid Probate" was not an unauthorized
practice of law since there was no personal contact or relationship with any particular individual so that there
was no relationship of competence and trust established which is so necessary to the status of attorney and

aron v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 535, 541-42, 86 Cal. Rptr. 673, 469 P.2d 353 (1970).
deciding whether an eviction service was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, the appellate court
People v. Landlords Professional Services, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1599, 1608, 264 Cal. Rptr. 548 (4th Dist.
)89) found:
That such services do not amount to the practice of law as long as the service offered by
[Landlords Professional Service] was merely clerical, i.e., the service did not engage in the
practice of law if it made forms available for the client's use, filled the form in at the specific
direction of the client and filed and served those forms as directed by the client. Likewise,
merely giving a client a manual, even [ * * 1 5 ] a detailed one containing specific advice, for the
preparation of an unlawful detainer action and the legal incidence of an eviction would not be
the practice of law if the service did not personally advise the client with regard to a specific
case.

\e court further commented:
The advertisement used by LPS implies its eviction services were not limited to clerical
functions. The tenor of the advertisement was that the service accomplished evictions. The
advertisements' statement "Call & talk to us" was a general invitation for clients to discuss the
matter of eviction with LPS. Bill Watts' LPS business card listed his title as "Counselor." In short,
LPS cast about itself an aura of expertise concerning evictions.

1 at 1608.
le UST contends that the Filippones provided the following services: (1) giving advice and selecting
.emptions for debtors; (2) giving advice regarding the selection of the appropriate bankruptcy Chapters; (3)
ving advice regarding reaffirmation of debts; (4) giving advice regarding the timing of filing bankruptcy; (5)
ving advice regarding the classification of debt; and (6) giving advice regarding the dischargeability of
udent [ * * 1 6 ] loans For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the various services which the
ippones performed constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
CALIFORNIA EXEMPTION LAW.
jker, Camera, Hansen, nlO McMartm, Kaitangian and Sanchez testified that they had no prior knowledge of
ihforma exemption law nor did they instruct the Filippones which California exemption they wished to
lect. n i l The debtors also testified that they were not provided with any written information describing
.emptions available under bankruptcy law in California by anyone at USPS. The debtors testified that after
ling out a questionnaire supplied by USPS, they would receive a telephone call to return to the USPS office
sign their bankruptcy pleadings which were to be filed with the bankruptcy court. n l 2 When the debtors
turned to sign the pleadings, a specific California exemption was claimed on their Schedule C. In other
Drds, the Filippones chose the exemptions for the debtors.
Footnotes

L0 Although Scott and Theresa Hansen filed a joint petition, only Theresa Hansen testified in this
oceedmg. Therefore, all references herein to Hansen are to Theresa Hansen [ * * 1 7 ]

LI California offers two sets of exemptions. California Code of Civil Procedure ("CCP") § 704 and CCP §
)3.140 The latter is commonly known as the California "federal" exemption and Incorporates, for the most
irt, the exemptions offered debtors under § 522(d)
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In re LANDRY, PAMELA KAYE, Debtor. In re PEARSON, ANNETTA NORINE, PEARSON, JAMES KEITH, Debtors.
LEIGH R. MEININGER, Trustee, Plaintiff, vs. STACEY BURNWORTH, PARALEGAL PAPERWORKS, INC.,
Defendants.
Case No. 99-09643-6J7, Case No. 99-01125-6J7, Adversary No. 99-00174
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, ORLANDO DIVISION
2 6 8 B.R. 3 0 1 ; 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1360; 46 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1657; 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 402

September 14, 2 0 0 1 , Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: In re Landry, 250 B.R. 4 4 1 , 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 732 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000)
DISPOSITION: [**1]
petition preparer.

Guidelines were established for determination of reasonable fees of a bankruptcy

COUNSEL: UNITED STATES TRUSTEE: ORLANDO, FL.
Chapter 7 Trustee: KENNETH D. HERRON, JR., ORLANDO, FL
Chapter 7 Trustee: LEIGH R. MEININGER, ORLANDO, FL.
For Defendant: VINETTE MORRIS HUDSON, ORLANDO, FL.
JUDGES: Karen S. Jennemann, United States Bankruptcy Judge.
O P I N I O N B Y : Karen S. Jennemann

OPINION: [*303]
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING THE DETERMINATION OF REASONABLE FEES
OF BANKRUPTCY PETITION PREPARER
On June 5, 2 0 0 1 , the Court heard evidence on what constitutes a reasonable fee [ * 3 0 4 ] to pay a
bankruptcy petition preparer for preparing bankruptcy pleadings in a consumer Chapter 7 bankruptcy case
and to establish guidelines for the determination of reasonable fees for similar cases in the future. These
combined cases involve one bankruptcy petition preparer, Stacey Burnworth, and her company, Paralegal
Paperworks, Inc. ("Paperworks"). Paperworks prepares bankruptcy [ * * 2 ] petitions and related pleadings for
prospective debtors, including the debtors in these cases, Ms. Landry and Mr. and Mrs. Pearson.
The Court previously ruled that Ms. Burnworth was entitled to a fee of $ 50 for her services on behalf of the
debtors. Ms. Burnworth appealed this decision, among others, and the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida remanded both cases "for an independent finding of what constitutes an appropriate
fee for services rendered by Appellant [Burnworth and Paperworks] based on current evidence both for and
against any such award of fee, and for the establishment of guidelines which will assist the Bankruptcy Court
in the future in carrying out its responsibility under Section 110 [of the Bankruptcy Code] to disallow
unreasonable fees." (Adv. No. 99-00174, Doc. No. 49).

lying to a large extent on the analysis of the District Court, this Court recognizes that in 1994, the
nkruptcy Code was amended, in part, to recognize and to regulate the role of a bankruptcy petition
sparer. A petition preparer is defined as "a person, other than an attorney, who prepares for compensation
document for filing." 11 U.S.C. § 110 [ * * 3 ] (a)(1). Section 110(h)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code n l further
Dvides that the bankruptcy court is required to disallow any bankruptcy petition preparer's fee found to be
i excess of the value of services rendered for the documents prepared." 11 U.S.C. § 110(h)(2).
Footnotes

Unless otherwise stated, all references to the Bankruptcy Code refer to Title 11 of the United States Code.

End Footnotes- e type of compensable services that a bankruptcy petition preparer can render are extremely limited,
tition preparers, who by definition are not attorneys, cannot give legal advice or otherwise engage in the
authorized practice of law. In re Guttierez, 248 B.R. 287, 296, n.25 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2000) (See cases
ed therein). Clearly, as recognized by the District Court, a bankruptcy petition preparer cannot assist the
btor in completing forms, provide legal advice that would assist a prospective debtor in making
terminations as to which type of bankruptcy to file or which exemptions [ * * 4 ] to take, or direct clients to
rticular legal publications or specific pages so that they can attempt to find legal answers on their own. The
ry act of directing a prospective debtor to review a particular section of a legal book in and of itself
nstitutes legal advice. By focusing on one answer and excluding others, the bankruptcy petition preparer
>ps over the line. As stated by the District Court, "Legal advice is legal advice, whether it comes directly
im the petition preparer or indirectly via, for example, a bankruptcy treatise being recited by that preparer,
rsons seeking legal assistance tend to place their trust in an individual purporting to have expertise in that
2a." Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1978).
erefore, a bankruptcy petition preparer can expect to receive compensation only for secretarial-type
rvices. As stated by the United States for the Western District of Texas in Guttierez:
[*305]
So what does § 110 tacitly permit? The answer in a nutshell is "not much." Section 110 itself
proscribes virtually all conduct falling into the category of guidance or advice, effectively
restricting "petition preparers" to [ * * 5 ] rendering only "scrivening/typing" services. Anything
else— be it suggesting bankruptcy as an available remedy for a debtor's financial problems,
merely explaining how to fill out the schedules, or answering questions about exemptions or
whether a claim is or is not secured will invariably contravene either state laws proscribing the
unauthorized practice of law or other more specific provisions of § 110. The only service that a
bankruptcy petition preparer can safely offer and complete on behalf of a pro se debtor after the
enactment of § 110 is the "transcription" of dictated or handwritten notes prepared by the
debtor prior to the debtor having sought out the petition preparer's service. Any other service
provided on behalf of the debtor by a non-attorney (even telling the debtor where the
information goes on the form) is not permitted under state unauthorized practice of law
statutes, and so is also not authorized by § 110.

i

uttierez, 248 B.R. at 297-98. Thus, under § 110, the services a bankruptcy petition preparer can provide
5 extremely limited.
bankruptcy petition preparer can meet a prospective debtor, provide forms or questionnaires [ * * 6 ] for the
btor to complete without any assistance from the bankruptcy petition preparer, transcribe the information
pplied by the prospective debtor on the applicable bankruptcy forms without change, correction, or
:eration, copy the pleadings, and gather all necessary related pleadings to file with the bankruptcy court.
e bankruptcy petition preparer cannot improve upon the prospective debtor's answers, cannot counsel the
ent on options, and cannot otherwise provide legal assistance to the prospective debtor, directly or
directly. However, to the extent the bankruptcy petition preparer provides the limited secretarial-type
rvices, the preparer is entitled to receive reasonable compensation.
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THE FLORIDA BAR, Petitioner, v. MARILYN R. BRUMBAUGH, Respondent
No. 48,803
Supreme Court of Florida

3 5 5 So. 2d 1 1 8 6 ; 1978 Fla. LEXIS 4657
January 10, 1978
COUNSEL:

[**1]

R. Layton Mank, Chairman, Standing Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, Miami, Florida; Richard C.
McFarlain, Assistant Director- Legal, Tallahassee, Florida; Young Joe Simmons, Counsel, Ocala, Florida; and
William B. Wiley and John A. Weiss, Assistants Staff Counsels, Tallahassee, Florida, for The Florida Bar,
Petitioner.
Marilyn R. Brumbaugh, in proper person, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Overton, C.J., Adkins, Boyd and Hatchett, JJ., concur. Karl, J., concurs specially with an opinion,
with which Overton, C.J., Adkins and Boyd, JJ. ; concur.
O P I N I O N B Y : PER CURIAM
O P I N I O N : [*1189] The Florida Bar has filed a petition charging Marilyn Brumbaugh with engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law, and seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting her from further engaging in
these allegedly unlawful acts. We have jurisdiction under our constitutional authority to adopt rules for the
practice and procedure in all the courts of this state. Article V, Section 2(a), Florida Constitution (1968). We
now issue an injunction, delineating in this opinion those acts of respondent which we deem to constitute the
unauthorized practice of law, and ordering her to stop such activities.
Respondent, Marilyn [ * * 2 ] Brumbaugh, is not and has never been a member of the Florida Bar, and is,
therefore, not licensed to practice law within this state. She has advertised in various local newspapers as
"Marilyn's Secretarial Service" offering to perform typing services for "Do-It-Yourself" divorces, wills,
resumes, and bankruptcies. The Florida Bar charges that she performed unauthorized legal services by
preparing for her customers those legal documents necessary in an uncontested dissolution of marriage
proceeding and by advising her customers as to the costs involved and the procedures which should be
followed in order to obtain a dissolution of marriage. For this service, Ms. Brumbaugh charges a fee of $50.
Of course, we must determine whether the Florida Bar has presented sufficient evidence in the record before
us to prove that respondent has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. But, in cases such as this, the
Florida Supreme Court is not confined to act solely in its judicial capacity. In addition, it acts in its
administrative capacity as chief policy maker, regulating the administration of the court system and
supervising all persons who are engaged in rendering legal advice to [ * * 3 ] members of the general public.
Such authority carries with it the responsibility to perform this task in a way responsive to the needs and
desires of our citizens. This principle has long been our goal. In State v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla.
1962), we noted:
The reason for prohibiting the practice of law by those who have not been examined and found

Sieved that she was an attorney, or that she was acting as an attorney in their behalf. Respondent's
ivertisements clearly addressed themselves to people who wish to do their own divorces. These customers
lew that they had to have "some [ * * 8 ] type of papers" to [*1191] file in order to obtain their dissolution
marriage. Respondent never handled contested divorces. During the past two years respondent has
ssisted several hundred customers in obtaining their own divorces. The record shows that while some of her
jstomers told respondent exactly what they wanted, generally respondent would ask her customers for the
Bcessary information needed to fill out the divorce papers, such as the names and addresses of the parties,
le place and duration of residency in this state, whether there was any property settlement to be resolved,
- any determination as to custody and support of children. Finally, each petition contained the bare
legation that the marriage was irretrievably broken. Respondent would then inform the parties as to which
Dcuments needed to be signed, by w h o m , how many copies of each paper should be filed, where and when
ley should be filed, the costs involved, and what witness testimony is necessary at the court hearing,
pparently, Ms. Brumbaugh no longer informs the parties verbally as to the proper procedures for the filing of
le papers, but offers to let them copy papers described as "suggested [ * * 9 ] procedural education."
ie Florida Bar argues that the above activities of respondent violate the rulings of this Court in The Florida
3r v. American Legal and Business Forms, Inc., 21A So.2d 225 (Fla. 1973), and The Florida Bar v. Stupica,
30 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1974). 3n those decisions we held that it is lawful to sell to the public printed legal forms,
-ovided they do not carry with them what purports to be instructions on how to fill out such forms or how to
se t h e m . We stated that legal advice is inextricably involved in the filling out and advice as to how to use
jch legal forms, and therein lies the danger of injury or damage to the public if not properly performed in
xordance with law. In Stupica, supra, this Court rejected the rationale of the New York courts in New York
ounty Lawyers' Association v. Dacey, 28 A.D.2d 1 6 1 , 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, reversed and dissenting opinion
Jopted 21 N.Y.2d 694, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967), which held that the publication of
>rms and instructions on their use does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law if these instructions
*e addressed to the public in general rather than to a specific individual [ * * 1 0 ] legal problem. The Court in
acey stated that the possibility that the principles or rules set forth in the text may be accepted by a
articular reader as solution to his problem, does not mean that the publisher is practicing law. Other states
ave adopted the principle of law set forth in Dacey, holding that the sale of legal forms with instructions for
leir use does not constitute unauthorized practice of law. See State Bar of Michigan v. Cramer, 399 Mich.
16, 249 N.W 2d 1 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ; Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Or 552, 538 P.2d 913 (1975). However, these
xjrts have prohibited all personal contact between the service providing such forms and the customer, in
le nature of consultation, explanation, recommendation, advice, or other assistance in selecting particular
>rms, in filling out any part of the forms, suggesting or advising how the forms should be used in solving the
articular problems.
Ithough persons not licensed as attorneys are prohibited from practicing law within this state, it is somewhat
ifficult to define exactly what constitutes the practice of law in all instances. This Court has previously stated
lat.
. . . if the giving [ * * 1 1 ] of such advice and performance of such services affect important rights
of a person under the law, and if the reasonable protection of the rights and property of those
advised and served requires that the persons giving such advice possess legal skill and a
knowledge of the law greater than that possessed by the average citizen, then the giving of
such advice and the performance of such services by one for another as a course of conduct
constitute the practice of law.

perry, supra, 140 So.2d at 591
his definition is broad and is given content by this Court only as it applies to specific circumstances of each
ase. We agree that "any attempt to formulate a [ * 1 1 9 2 ] lasting, all encompassing definition of 'practice of
iw' is doomed to failure 'for the reason that under our system of jurisprudence such practice must
ecessanly change with the ever-changing business and social order.'" State Bar of Michigan v. Cramer,
upra, 249 N.W.2d at 7.
i determining whether a particular act constitutes the practice of law, our primary goal is the protection of
^e public However, any limitations on the free practice of law by all persons necessarily affects
nportant [ * * 1 2 ] constitutional rights. Our decision here certainly affects the constitutional rights of Marilyn
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together with the words "Paid in Full"
written on the account, is sufficient to
prevent a finding of an amount due
and owing, and, therefore, plaintiff has
not carried the biirden of proof.
As
previously discussed, it was unnecessary for plaintiff to produce the note because of defendant's judicial admission,
and, therefore, no presumption of payment
can be garnered from non-production of
the note. Plaintiffs evidence set forth
above was sufficient to overcome any inference of payment which was raised by
the scratched out words, "Paid in Full,"
and we conclude the trial judge was correct in finding that plaintiff carried his
burden of proof of the debt.
[3-5] Plaintiff claims by his crossappeal that the trial court erred in failing
to award attorney's fees in case of foreclosure as provided by the mortgage. We believe the question to be moot even if attorney's fees should have been allowed by the
trial court because the record discloses that
the mortgage was a purchase money mortgage. The property covered by the mortgage was sold to plaintiff on foreclosure
during the pendency of this appeal for the
amount of the trial court judgment. This
judgment did not include an award for attorney's fees. There remain no secured
assets with which to satisfy any judgment that might now be awarded for
attorney's fees. When a personal judgment is entered against the mortgagor in
the foreclosure of a purchase money mortgage, the excess over the amount realized
from a sale of the mortgaged realty is
.void. Stretch v. Murphy, 166 Or. 439, 447,
112 P.2d 1018 (1941); ORS 88.070. In
addition, upon redemption the defendant
can be required to pay only the price paid
for the property by the purchaser at foreclosure sale plus those other charges provided by ORS 88.080 and 23.560(2). Defendant could not be forced upon redemption to pay a judgment for attorney's fees
awarded subsequent to sale on foreclosure.
The iudement of the trial court is af-
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State Bar brought suit to enjoin defendants, who were not lawyers, from
practicing law through advertising and sale
of do-it-yourself divorce kits. The Circuit
Court, Multnomah County, John C. Beatty,
Jr., J., entered decree enjoining defendants'
activities, and they appealed. The Supreme Court, McAllister, J., held that defendants did not engage in "practice of
law" in merely publishing, advertising and
selling such kits and thus they could not be
enjoined from engaging in that part of
their business, but that all personal contact
between defendants and their customers in
nature of Consultation, explanation, recommendation or advice or other assistance
with regard to certain matters constituted
the "practice of law" and had to be strictly
enjoined.
Decree modified, and as modified, affirmed.

1. Dismissal and Nonsuit <S^46

Nonsuit may only be granted in actions at law.
2. Attorney and Client <§=>! 1(2)

Persons, who were not lawyers, did
not engage in "practice of law," in merely
publishing by advertising and selling do-ityourself divorce kits, and thus they could
not be enjoined from engaging in that part
of their business.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Divorce <£=>I46

Anv person has unqualified right to

and to settle related issues of property
rights, child custody, support and visitation
without help of either an attorney or forms
contained with a do-it-yourself divorce kit.
ORS 9.320.
4. Attorney and Client <^>\\(2)

With regard to sale of do-it-yourself
divorce kits by persons who were not attorneys, all personal contact between such
persons and their customers in nature of
consultation, expla nation, recommendation
or advice or other assistance in selecting
particular forms, in filling out of any part
of forms or in suggesting or advising how
forms should be used in solving particular
customer's marital problems constituted the
"practice of law" and had to be strictly enjoined.

John Bassett, Milwaukie, argued
cause and filed a brief for appellants.

the

Barry P. Caplan, Portland, argued the
cause for respondent. With him on the
brief were Daniel C. Ellis, Garry L. Kahn
and Gino G. Pieretti, Portland.

MCALLISTER,

justice.

The plaintiff, Oregon State Bar, brought
this suit to enjoin the defendants John W.
Gilchrist, Robert J. Lavorato and Bev Coloma from practicing law through the advertising and sale of do-it-yourself divorce
kits. Defendant Bev Coloma consented to
the entry of a decree against her as prayed
for in the complaint and is not a party to
this appeal, from an adverse decree the
defendants Gilchrist and Lavorato appeal.
The defendants John W. Gilchrist and
Robert J. Lavorato, neither of whom are
licensed to practice law, own and operate a
business known as the Oregon Divorce
Council. Their business consists of the
sale of do-it-yourself divorce kits containing a manual for divorce, forms and instructions designed to enable an individual
to complete and file the forms necessary to
secure a dissolution of marriage.
T h e kit includes / ^

a nf»+ifirm fn* ^i'ec^

marital settlement agreement; (d) an order of default; (e) an affidavit of nonmilitary service; (f) a decree of dissolution of marriage; and (g) a manual for
divorce which explains the forms and instructs the customer how to use them.
The manual uses as an illustration the
hypothetical case of Mary Jane Doe v.
John Robert Doe. A sample passage of
the manual reads:
"MARY D O E P R E P A R E S T H E
PETITION TO DISSOLVE
T H E MARRIAGE
"In their determination to proceed with
as little cost as possible, John and Mary
called the O R E G O N D I V O R C E COUNCIL for information as to the functions
of the Council in assisting people to obtain a divorce representing themselves.
"Securing an appointment, they met with
the Council's Executive Director, Jack
Gilchrist, at which time the couple was
informed of the functions of the Council
and what would transpire in their proceedings for a divorce.
"Director Gilchrist explained in depth
the cost factors involved, what sequence
of order the divorce action would follow
in the court, and what was expected of
each party. Moreover, John and Mary
were instructed as to properly completing the 'Marital Settlement Agreement'
and the need for such an agreement to
simplify the divorce proceedings. The
Director further explained the advantage
of Mary being the petitioner and to that
end, Jack agreed.
"After registering with the Council as a
new member Mary was given a T O R T F O L I O ' that contained all of the procedural information necessary to obtain the
divorce, plus all of the official court
forms that would be needed.
"Taking the ' P O R T F O L I O 1 home, Mary,
with the help of John began preparing
the petition and summons, the first

married persons, determine child custody,
support or visitation.
"5. Advertising by any means or media the availability for sale of forms,
which advertisements expressly or impliedly represent that the forms which
defendants have available for sale are
sufficient to terminate a marriage, settle
property rights between married persons,
determine child custody, support or visitation.
"6. Suggesting contents of child custody, property settlement agreements entered into by the parties to a divorce or
aiding said parties in wording a child
custody or property settlement agreement
or a decree incorporating a negotiation
of child custody, support, visitation, or
the property rights of the parties.
"7. Questioning prospective customers by form or otherwise in order to acquire information necessary to the drafting, filling out or choice of such forms,
and
"8. Carrying on any activity which
will aid and abet defendants in the violation of items 1 through 7 of this decree."
[1] The defendants assign as error the
denial of their motion for an involuntary
nonsuit. Since this is a suit in equity and
a nonsuit may only be granted in actions at
law, we need not concern ourselves with
this assignment of error.
The defendants concede that when they
were interviewing customers, answering
their questions, recommending forms to be
used by particular customers and helping
them to complete the forms and in any
way counseling with customers, they were
engaged in the practice of law. In their
brief defendants concede:
"While this court may find that the
defendants did have personal contact
with their customers and may have answered questions which constituted the
giving of legal advice, any such legal advice by defendants should be enjoined,

the forms and written
should not be enjoined."

instructions

[2] Defendants' basic contention is
stated in their briei as follows:
"While this court may enjoin the defendants from acting in an advisory capacity to its customers in recommending
or designing completed forms, the writing, advertising and sale of forms in
combination with a text of material relating to the completion of those forms
which text is impersonal and involves
nothing discretionary between defendants
and customers should not be enjoined
and the trial court decree should be modified in accordance therewith."
We believe that paragraph 2 of the decree unduly restricts the activities of the
defendants and cannot be sustained. In
our view defendants cannot be enjoined
from merely publishing or selling their divorce kits so long as the defendants have
no personal contact with their customers.
We find persuasive the holding in New
York County Lawyers* Association v. Daceyy 28 A.D.2d 161, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, reversed 21 N.Y.2d 694, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422, 234
N.E.2d 459 (1967). There it was held that
the publication, distribution and selling of
Norman F. Dacey's book "How to Avoid
Probate" did not constitute the practice of
law since the publication was directed to the
general public and not to a specific individual. The dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division, which was adopted by the
Court of Appeals, stated in pertinent part:
" * * * It cannot be claimed that
the publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amounts to
legal practice. And the mere fact that
the principles or rules stated in the text
may be accepted by a particular reader
as a solution to his problem, does not affect this. Courts and lawyers continuously use and cite texts for this very
purpose. So also with forms. The publication of a multitude of forms for all
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children but they don't have the proper
forms for that, or they come in and they
don't have service accomplished, but the
things that we do the most, that I do the
most often with the people is to help
them fill out the forms, because they
come with them blank."
The plaintiff called as witnesses only
four persons who had purchased divorce
kits from defendants. In each case a divorce was obtained. In one case the form
submitted to the court stated erroneously
that the husband was to be awarded the
home when in fact the parties lived in a
rented house. The error was disclosed
during the divorce hearing and corrected
by the trial judge.
In another case there was difficulty in
obtaining service on the husband, who was
a soldier stationed in Korea, and because
of this complication, the customer engaged
a lawyer to complete the proceeding.
]n a third case the witness purchased a
divorce kit and had the forms filled out by
the defendants, but the forms were not
used and the witness engaged a lawyer to
obtain her divorce.
In the fourth case the customer purchased a divorce kit and after some delay
obtained a divorce, but was dissatisfied,
primarily because an automobile owned
jointly with the husband was not awarded
to her.
In all four of these cases it is clear that
defendants' employees were flagrantly
practicing law by counseling with and giving advise to the customers. However, the
plaintiff did not attempt to prove that the
forms were not effective if used as directed.
It may be that many laymen are not
qualified on their own to select the proper
forms and to complete the forms with the
necessary exactitude to terminate their
marriage and settle the related issues of
property rights, child custody, support and
visitation. However, the fact that some
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marriage does not justify preventing the
defendants from advertising that marriage
dissolution and its related issues can be accomplished by the use of the divorce kits.
The Supreme Court of Florida has taken
a different view and has held that the giving of specialized advice to a general audience rather than to a particular individual
constitutes the practice of law. See The
Florida Bar v. American Legal & Bus.
Forms, Inc., 274 So.2d 225 (Fla.1973) and
The Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So.2d 683
(Fla.1974).
Although defendants do not restrict the
sale of their divorce kits to persons obtaining noncontested divorces, it is clear that
their advertising is directed primarily to
persons in that class. Two of the advertisements quoted supra refer particularly to
"non-contested divorce".
The Manual for Divorce, which is the
explanatory textual material included with
each kit, contains on the first page immediately under the Table of Contents the
following disclaimer in large type:
"PUBLISHER'S MEMO
*

*

*

*

*

*

"THE SERVICES PROVIDED IN
YOUR MEMBERSHIP MAY NOT BE
APPLICABLE FOR EVERYONE.
YOUR COUNCIL RECOMMENDS
THIS SERVICE ONLY FOR THOSE
W H O CAN ENTER INTO A DEFAULT CATAGORY. FOR THOSE
W H O MAY SUFFER OPPOSITION
FROM YOUR SPOUSE BECAUSE
OF CHILD CUSTODY, OR PROPERTY DIVISION, ALIMONY, OR ANY
OF THE OTHER PROBLEMS THAT
HAVE ARISEN BETWEEN THE
T W O PARTIES, THE COUNCIL
STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT
YOU ENGAGE THE SERVICES OF
AN ATTORNEY."
[3] It should not be overlooked that
ORS 9,320 provides that "any action, suit,
or proceeding may be prosecuted or de-

to prosecute a suit to terminate his marriage and to settle the related issues of
property rights, child custody, support and
visitation without the help of either an attorney or forms obtained from defendants
or any other similar source.
[4] We conclude that in the advertising
and selling of their divorce kits the defendants are not engaged in the practice of
law and may not be enjoined from engaging in that part of their business. We further conclude, however, that all personal
contact between defendants and their customers in the nature of consultation, explanation, recommendation or advice or other
assistance in selecting particular forms, in
filling out any part of the forms, or suggesting or advising how the forms should
be used in solving the particular customers
marital problems does constitute the practice of law and must be and is strictly enjoined.
The decree of the trial court is modified
in accordance with the foregoing opinion
and, as so modified, is affirmed.
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Proceeding to determine timeliness of
lessee's notice to renew lease was submitted for decision upon agreed statement of
case.
The Circuit Court, Multnomah
Conntv
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notice was timely and lessor appealed.
The Supreme Court, Tongue, J., held that
statute providing that any act required to
be performed on a holiday may be performed on the next succeeding business
day extends to acts to be performed as
provided by contracts; hence where lease
required notice to renew at least 30 days
prior to expiration of current term, and
the 30th day prior to expiration date was a
Sunday, and on the next Monday lessee
mailed notice of election to renew lease
which also provided that notice would be
deemed given at time of mailing, notice
was timely.
Affirmed.

1. Time <3=*I0(I0)

At common law, when the last day for
the performance of an act required by contract falls on a Sunday, the act may be
performed on the following day.
2. Time <^I0(I0)

Rule that when the last day for performance of an act required by contract
falls on a Sunday, the act may be performed on the following day is ordinarily
to be applied in landlord and tenant cases
for purposes of computing time for payment of rent or for giving notice to terminate a tenancy.
3. Time <@=>IO(iO)

Statute providing that any act required
to be performed on a holiday may be performed on the next succeeding business
day and no liability or loss of rights of any
kind shall result from such delay extends
to acts to be performed as provided by
contracts, at least unless the contract specifically designates a Sunday as the day on
which an act must be performed or as the
last day on which the act may be performed. ORS 27.010, 187.010(2).
4. Time <&=>I0(I0)

Where lease required that notice to renew be given at least 30 days prior to expiration of term, and the 30th day prior to
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In the Matter of New York County Lawyers' Association, Respondent, v. Norman F. Dacey et al., Appellants
[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL]
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department
2 8 A.D.2d 1 6 1 ; 283 N.Y.S.2d 9 8 4 ; 1967 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3230
October 24, 1967
PRIOR HISTORY:

[***l]

Matter of New York County Lawyers' Assn. v. Dacey, 54 Misc 2d 564, modified.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Charles Marks, J.), entered September 12,
1967 in New York County, which held appellant Dacey in contempt of court and fined him $ 250 and granted
an injunction against all of the appellants.
D I S P O S I T I O N : Judgment affirmed as to respondents Norman F. Dacey and Norman F. Dacey doing business
as National Estate Planning Council, with $ 50 costs and disbursements to the petitioner. Under the
circumstances, however, the terms of the judgment of the court insofar as it is directed against the
respondents book publishers, distributors and sellers is limited to the enjoining of the acts and conduct on
their part tending to promote the unlawful practice of law by Dacey in this State. Therefore, the injunctive
provisions of said judgment, as affecting the respondents Crown Publishers, Inc., Doubleday & Co. Inc. and
Brentano's Inc. are modified to restrain them from the further publication, advertisement, distribution and
sale in New York of the present book "How To Avoid Probate!", and of any modification thereof which
purports to induce lay persons [ * * * 2 ] to rely upon the legal advice or expertise of Dacey in the selection,
use, completion or execution of legal forms, instruments or writings for the purpose of establishing any jural
relationship or effecting the transfer or disposition of property; and said judgment is otherwise affirmed as to
said last-named respondents, without costs and without disbursements.
Settle order on notice.
HEADNOTES:
Attorney and client — u n l a w f u l practice of law — author, nonlawyer, of book containing legal
advice and detachable f o r m s of wills and deeds of trust w i t h do-it-yourself instructions to l a y m e n ,
"assumes t o practice l a w " (Judiciary Law, § 7 5 0 , subd. B) and w a s properly adjudged in c o n t e m p t
of court — publishers and booksellers a r e enjoined f r o m advertising, distributing or selling such
book in N e w York.
1. The first-named respondent, who does business under the name of National Estate Planning Council, and
who is not a lawyer, "assumes to practice law" (Judiciary Law, § 750, subd. B; Penal Law, §§ 270, 2 7 1 , 280,
subd. 3), and was therefore properly adjudged in contempt of court. He authored a book called "How To
Avoid Probate!" consisting of about 55 pages of text and about 310 pages [ * * * 3 ] containing 26 declaration
and deed of trust forms, 2 deed forms, 5 revocation of trust forms, 1 form of amendment of deed of trust,
and 12 will forms, each in duplicate and perforated for removal from the book, and each with a page or more
of instructions to laymen on how to use these "legally correct" forms so as to "avoid the delay, expense and
publicity of probate of * * * your home * * * your bank account * * * your stocks and bonds * * * your
automobile * * * your close corporation * * * your mutual fund shares * * * your small unincorporated
business * * * your personal effects". Also in the book is an order form whereby a purchaser may order

he book.
[**997] Here the claim of unauthorized practice of law rests upon the writing and publication of this book of
/hich some 600,000 copies have been sold. Petitioner complains also of the advertising which appears on the
acket of the book. The advertising in question refers to Dacey as one of America's leading professional estate
danners. The book, as the title indicates, attempts to inform the purchaser how to avoid probate.
Petitioner asserts that by the appellants' representations to the public they were selling legal advice and they
vere representing that Dacey was an expert qualified and competent [*173] to give such legal advice.
Petitioner alleges the scheme and plan created by Dacey, and carried into effect by Crown Publishers Inc.,
vho published the book, and Doubleday & Co., Inc. and Brentano's Inc., who sold and distributed the book,
institute the unauthorized practice of law; that Crown, Doubleday and Brentano's are equally responsible
>ecause they have been engaged in aiding and abetting the [***28] unauthorized practice of law and that
in injunction may issue under subdivision B of section 750 of the Judiciary Law, which section they assert is
:lear and unambiguous.
)acey contends that his acts cannot, as a matter of law, constitute the unauthorized practice of law in the
ibsence of proof of the giving of specific advice to a specific individual about his particular problems; that the
>ublication and distribution of a book containing forms is not the equivalent of giving specific advice to
ipecific individuals about their particular problems, and does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
"he defendants urge several defenses based on contentions that subdivision B of section 750 violates
lifferent articles of the Federal Constitution. In the view taken it is not necessary to consider these
intentions, and attention is directed only to the question of whether the publication of this book constitutes
>ractice of the law within the meaning of the section.
Stripped of the arguments and the contentions of the various parties, the question may be briefly and baldly
expressed: Does the writing, publication, advertising, sale and distribution of "How To Avoid Probate!"
[***29] constitute the unauthorized practice of law within the meaning of subdivision B of section 750? It
:annot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amounts to legal
)ractice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular
•eader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. Courts and lawyers continuously use and cite texts
:
or this very purpose. So also with forms. The publication of a multitude of forms for all manner of legal
situations is a commonplace activity and their use by the Bar and the public is general. In fact, many statutes
and court rules contain the forms to be used in connection with them. Apparently it is urged that the
:onjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
institutes the [**998] unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted
:exts.
[*174] Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual, Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the
status [***30] of attorney and client. This is the essential of legal practice — the representation and the
advising of a particular person in a particular situation. The lectures of a law school professor are not legal
practice for the very reason that the principles enunciated or the procedures advised do not refer to any
activity in immediate contemplation though they are intended and conceived to direct the activities of the
students in situations which may arise. Moreover, there is no claim here as there was in the Connecticut
proceeding ( Grievance Committee of Bar of Fairfield County v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 222 A. 2d 339,
rehearing den. 387 U.S. 938) that Dacey, in effect, prepared instruments tailored to the particular needs of
his customers.
Special Term referred to and placed a measure of reliance on the determination of the Connecticut court in
making its own determination. In the Connecticut proceeding against Dacey it was determined that in
addition to the preparation of a 30-page booklet Dacey prepared trusts and wills adapted to clients' needs
providing, at the same time, for large potential profits to himself in the sale of Wellington Fund shares on
which he received [***31] a 6% commission. The court declared, when Dacey prepared wills and trusts for
his customers and advised, as to the desirability in their circumstances, of the specific wills or trusts so
prepared for them he engaged in the illegal practice of law. Certainly that case may readily be distinguished.
At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person.
"How To Avoid Probate!" may be purchased by anyone willing to pay the purchase price. One is free to
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Sutherland, J. G. (Jabez Gridley), 1825-1902

Title

Statutes and statutory construction / by J. G. Sutherland.

Edition

Revision of Sands fourth edition / by Norman J. Singer.

Publisher
Description
Subjects

Notes

Bibliography
Local Note

Other Author
Other Title
Bib Number
LCCN
Control #

Wilmette, 111. : Callaghan, 1984-1990.
v.; 25 cm.
Statutes - United States.
Legislation - United States.
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tion existed".
§ 51.03 Statutes deemed to be in pari materia
p. 2 0 1
Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they relate to the
- 28Western States Newspapers, Inc. v. Gehringer, 203 Cal. App. 2d 793,22 Cal. Rptr.
f144 (4th Dist. 1962).
United States. Water Quality Ass'n Employees' Benefit Corp. v. U.S., 795 F.2d
1303 (7th Cir. 1986).
Alabama. House v. Cullman County, 593 So. 2d 69 (Ala. 1992).
Connecticut. Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 41 Conn. App. 671, 677 A.2d
•960 (1996), certification granted in part, 239 Conn. 905, 682 A.2d 999 (1996) and
judgment rev'd on other grounds, 240 Conn. 671, 694 A.2d 1218 (1997).
Kansas. Fought v. State, 14 Kan. App. 2d 17, 781 P.2d 742 (1989).
North Dakota. Kroh v. American Family Ins., 487 N.W.2d 306 (N.D. 1992).
Tennessee. State v. Davis, 654 S.W.2d 688 (Term. Crim. App. 1983).
Virginia. Williams v. Matthews, 248 Va. 277, 448 S.E.2d 625 (1994).
Richards & Stearns, Shareholder By-Laws Requiring Boards of Directors to
Dismantle Rights Plans Are Unlikely to Survive Scrutiny Under Delaware Law, 54
Bus Law 607 (1999).

me same purpose or object/
The rule of in pari materia is generally used when there is some doubt
or ambiguity in the wording of the statute under consideration. 3
Characterization of the object or purpose is more important than
characterization of subject matter in determining whether different
statutes are closely enough related to justify interpreting one in light of
the other.4 Yet courts have stated that each section of a law which deals
with the same subject matter must be read in pari materia with other
sections on the same subject.5 The doctrine of in pari materia for statutory construction may be applied to executive orders.6
In light of these rules there have been a plethora of decisions on the.
issue of in pari materia. It has been held that sales tax and use tax
statutes are construed in pari materia.7 Because a statute prohibiting
driving while intoxicated and an implied consent statute were both
regarded as serving the common purpose of highway safety, they were
held to be in pari materia.8 Basic goals, in New Jersey, of the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Ownership
Law, to protect the innocent or good faith purchasers are in harmony.9
The Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act (MERLA) are in pari materia.10 Federal employees are permitted as a matter of course to bring suit under both
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situation.33 It has been said that the "total corpus of pertinent law"
may be considered.34 It should also be noted that courts have held that
application of the rule must be applied before any other rules of statutory construction.35 But a definition which relates specifically to a term
as used in a single article of a code cannot be used in pari materia with
other articles.36
Since the purpose of an amendment is to make changes in the act being amended, great caution should be used in holding statutes in pari
materia where an amendment is involved.37 Nevertheless it has been allowed that "an amendatory act shall be construed in context with the
act which it is designed to amend."38 An amended act comprises part
of the legislative history of the amending act.39
To be in pari materia, statutes need not have been enacted simultaneously40 or refer to one another.41 A marijuana trafficking statute and a
statute defining "second or subsequent offense" as any drug offense
^Pennsylvania. Bruzzi v. Bruzzi, 332 Pa. Super. 346, 481 A.2d 648 (1984).
34

United States. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S.
235, 90 S. Ct. 1583, 26 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1970) (overruling on other grounds recognized
by, Local Lodge No. 1266, Intern. Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFLCIO v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981)) and (overruling recognized by,
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 847 F.
Supp. 1294 (E.D. Pa. 1994)); U. S. v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
Alabama. Kirkland v. State, 529 So. 2d 1036 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
' Wyoming. Matter of ALL 836 P.2d 307 (Wyo. 1992).
35
Indiana. Northwest Associates v. Board of Assessors of Burlington, 386 Mass.
1006, 437 N.E.2d 235 (1982).
36
West Virginia. Waldron v. Leevale Collieries, 127 W. Va. 443, 33 S.E.2d 227
(1945).
37
United States. Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act and Federal Employers' Liability Act should be construed together whether or not the former is an amendment to
the latter. Green v. River Terminal Ry. Co., 585 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ohio 1984), judgment aff'd, 763 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1985).
Oklahoma. Letteer v. Conservancy Dist. No. 30, in Tulsa, Osage, Rogers and
Washington Counties, 1963 OK 218, 385 P.2d 796 (Okla. 1963).
See ch 22.
38
Hutter v. Spenny, 8 Mich. App. 719, 155 N.W.2d 250 (1967).
Califonia. In re Lee, 78 Cal. App. 3d 753, 144 Cal. Rptr. 528 (3d Dist. 1978).
39
Califonia. Fair v. Fountain Valley School Dist., 90 Cal. App. 3d 180, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 56 (4th Dist. 1979).
See ch 48.
40
United States. A code section providing liability for court costs would be read
tncwtTifr w i t h a n n t h p r c p ^ t i n n epftinrr attr>rnp»w'o fiwo wrVior-o +k<a f n r m a r mnn -atmnnt^A

„„
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stark - • . i'-.
•. | (,. «i> paiMiu i K rule th.it l e g i s l a t i v e p r o v i ctnn^. •,«. ii| ( ;!i ,,[-, >n p a r ' n ;M-*t*ip sh;": 1 • K - onstnii'il toir^fhe'- >nnii<>c
•

f

;ouil."

Tennessee. State ex icl. Strong ,. .Mrong, 1,5 ienn. 291, 133 S.W.id 99o v 19j9);
I A on- v. Rasar, 8 7 2 S.W.2d 895. 90 Ed. Law Rep. 504 (Tenn. 1994); Johnson v.
Johnson. 40 I enn. \pp. 655. 292 SAV.2d 4~2 t\l)V>)
Texas. Shelln \ State, 479 S.W.2d 31 ( lex. (Vim. App. 1972); Madeley v. Trustees
ofConroe Independent School Hist., 130 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. Beaumont 1939),
writ dismissed, judgment correct; Harrington v. State, 385 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.
Austin 1964), writ granted, (July 14, 1965) and judgment rev'd on other grounds, 407
S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966); Texas Water Com'n v. Acker, 774 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.
Austin 1989), writ granted, (Jan. 24, 1990) and judgment aff'd and remanded on ytlier
grounds, 790 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1990), relfg of cause overruled, (June 13, !9'>n,
Utah. Murray City v. Hall, 663 I\2d 1314 (Utah 1983).
Vermont. Board of Trustees of Kellogg-Hubbard Library, Inc. v. Labor Relations
Bd., 162 Vt. 571. M9 A.2d 784 < 11)91;
Virginia. Branch \ Co... :•: \ a. App *16. 419 S.E.2d 422 (1992V
Washington. < ;.. !• Pacilicorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d KG :••;-., , ^uite v.
Andrews, 43 Wash. App. 49, 715 P.2d 526 (Div. 3 1986).
W st Virginia. Concerned Loved Ones and Lot Owners Ass'n of Beverly mils Memorial Gardens v. Pence, 181 W. Va. 649, 383 S.E.2d 831 (1989); West Virginia Dept.
of Health and Human Resources v. Hess, 189 W. Va. 357, 432 S.E.2d 27 (1993).
v • onsin. Sentinel News Co. v. Industrial Commission, 224 Wis. 355, 271 N.W.
413 (1937); State v. I emby, 108 Wis. 2d 521, 322 N.W.2d522 (Ct. App. 1982);Northwest General Hosp. v. Yee, 109 Wis. 2d 644, 327 N.W.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1982), decision rev'd on other grounds, 115 Wis. 2d 59, 339 N.W.2d 583 (1983); Schwetz v.
Employers Ins. o( Wausau, 126 Wis. 2d 32, 374 N.W.2d 241, 27 Ed. Law Rep. 946
(Ct. App. 1985) (overruled on other grounds by, Colbv v. Columbia County, 202 Wis.
2d 342. 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996)); State v. Thomas, 128 Wis. 2d 93, 381 N.W.2d 567
(Ct. App, 1985), review denied; Rossie v. State/Dept. of Revenue, 133 Wis. 2d 341,
395 N.W.2d 801, 65 A.l..R.4th \ ivi (Ct. App 198<>:: P.irkv v. City of Madison, 199
Wis. 2d 122. 545 N.W.2d 5ll> i( i. App. l^'G.
V1'- >>ming. Carpenter & Carpenter v. Kingham, DO w >u. ^ ; i, IUV r._u ~+o ^ ^i941),
opiniv.n modified on denial of reh'g, Carpenter & Carpenter v Kinoham. 56 Wvo. 314,
110 P.2d 824 (1941).
Gomez, The Consequences of Nonappearance: Interpreting New Sect on 242B of
the Immigration and NationaliK \ct. 30 San 1 »-egi • 1 Rf "^ - 1w* i
4

Michigan. Michigan Ass'n of Intermediate Special Hduc. Administrators \. Department of Social Services, 207 Mich Ann '.<" ^> ^ » ' \ p * Q'- F (! G r »-p 1127
(1994).
5

Unif- * -ncA. Kuwab v. brie Lackawanna k. , .,., b i . ._u o„ \i :\.L..^. red.
863 (3d
« G i): Julian v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 178 F.R.I). 10, 40 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d 944 (D. Conn. 1998): U.S. v. Lata. Gl !•' \\ IS"* ( Li Gir. 1 9 ^ 1 er denied,
120 S Gt. 432 (U.S. 1990)
The court will not blindly adopt
H>.I .I lnterpreiauou on me mbii mat
a statute of another jurisdiction- has . ...
.... To do so would be a sacrifice of the
deciding courts reasoned analysis and i
.ent thinking. Custodio v. Boonprakong,
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together;23 mail and wire fraiv statutes have been heldto be in ruu materia so that cases concerning one apph qualh • i: . sther -'' the \ cj" <{
Pav \ ; . iitle VII rl iih • : d Rights \cf ol 1 '64 and thi (lassihca. .. . \.. A;-., .iii i.. j.ui materia as their purpose is to proudi uniformity
ol" treatment for all employees;25 the sex disi lamination provisions of
the cr-S rights employment discrimination statute must be -v u; ->
harmc- \iih Hv pi«>\ MUIIS of the Equal Pay Act when determining
:!i:- a:
pnaic f.uk pay award;26 the extradition provision of the
G: inform Reciprocal Knforcement of Support Act and the I n'oriri
Criminal Hxtradition Act must be construed togethei when applied in
criminal extradition proceedings for the crime of nonsuppon.-' the nofault and uninsured motorist statutes both relate to losses from inmries
occurring in r,;'.«.<. non w M.'I motor vehicles arut should be "en*1
materia since the\ relate to die same class of pet sons ih
In like mannei me pj.-.-.a ;...:;» ag.Uiis, anung under the influence •
aicuiu:i mirrors the prohibition against operating watercraft under the
influence of alcohol or drugs of abuse and!- flTat extent the two statutes
should K1 eons'r• •• • •'*• - • •••• 'S.^-.t v:.\ harmonious tashion "!
Ttisai-o imponant lo-s.i ".ine what <-t her forms of enactment might
be included in a decision ! 01 example, it has been held that Rules ol
Civil Procedure promulgated by a Supreme Court have the same force
and etf. -J a> statutes passed be the legislature:'0
Statutes have been held t- K: in pan materia whether indepei.d. I
amendatory in lorm; whether m the form ;d'a complete enactment ueaiing with a single, limited suh-iet »"..•«•
• fsprtmn^ in .,. i^ ....».;
::::

Ne\v ^ (irk. Matter of Lstatc of Seaman, ,'s ;-,A .-d 4^1, 576 N.Y.S.2d 838, 583
N.L.2d2 l M. , l , Wl).
24
;

Unitcd States, D'Torio \ Adoni/.io, 554 F. Supp. 222 ( \I.I) Pa. 1082).

?5

United States. Grumbine \. I S, 586 F. Sup r ! l 4 4 i ( ) I ) (

>••

).

26

i United States. Crabtree v Baptist Hosp. of Gadsden, JIC, ",'4y l'.2d 1501 (11th
Cir. 1985).
27

Georgia. In re Pace, 250 Ga. HO. 297 S F 2.1 255 (1082).

.^Pennsylvania. 'Iucet v. State Farm Ins. Co., 5tH |>a. 44". 469 A.2d lt>25 i !'»s ?)
29

0hio. State v. 1 ePard, 52 < )ln« \pp. 3d 83, 557 N.F.2d 166 (6th Dist. Guawa
County 1989).
30

Pennsylvania. The statutory provision and the Rules of Civil Procedure relate to
the same subject matter, partition of property, and therefore should be read in pari materia. Lonmiller v. Weidenbaueh. sir- Pa 1™) 4fi«) \ "»a S7S MOM ,
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p. Itttt
unencumbered manner'
•n.-n tin iar?nage of a ^tate act i> .copied
from federal legislation, .v. its wil ordinarily construe the state statute
in accordance with the construction given the federal statute '" n like
manner, it has been held that the power to enact
.nt\ ;esoluuon on
a matter that is nko subject of a state statute i~ pu nutted if the icsolution and the statute can be harmonized '' The Michigan Supreme Court
heh' '• '' ,: e two statutes are construed together as the intent f both
statutes in question is aitnetl at the same situation. < )ne provides a remedy for highw a\ defects ami the other intends to provide l~ojd relief to
designated benelieiarie- •• **o have sustained a loss as > result of a
wrongful death.'- The Iowa Suprenu ( .mri nas held that he availability of different penaltie- for essentially the same conduct alone is
not enough to prefer one statute over the other ,:!
Pnmsion^ W- ,MIC .i>* 'uch a:«- omitted • another on die same
subject matter will be applied when the purposes of the two acts are
consistent." Prior statute** relating to the same Mihieil matter are
compared with the nc», ^;ovision, ii n is possible bj reasonable
"Carter v. Brodrick, (44 P.2:1 SS() (Alaska

V^2).

Connecticut. Hoard ol'Publu' Utilities Com'rs ol ('ii\ of Norwich \. Yankee Gas
Services Co.. 230 (mm. 2X7. o 7 2 A.2d 9 ^ i U>9n
Mas^aohu^rtls ' : . • • . ' Metropolitan : )K. i '"in n. .••>,. \ l a ^ r I < • *>
• \ 2u >S6
(198..
"Ioua.

, . T . .;

.

,

•

•

i-#J.

(Iowa 199").
12

l.nd\kie\VR/

. Miilc lhyh.A„. ( oni ... i. . \i._:;

" l i m a . Slate v. Peters. 52- \ W .2d 854 (Ioua 199!.
'H nited States. Milas v. U.S., 42 l ; ed. CI. 704 (1999), all\l. I vv9 w ,. <S2D288
(Vcd. Cir. 1999). U.S. v. Fixieo, 115 F.2d 389 ( C C A . 10th Cir. 1940); Richerson v.
Jones. 551 F.2d918.43 A 1 R 1\ d. 191 i \\ fir N^~>.
The deliberate selection oi' language so differing from that used in earlier Acts
indicates that a change of law was intended. Gutierrez de Martinez v. 1 .aaiiuMi" ^15
U.S. 417, 115 S. Ct. 2227, 132 L. Ed. 2d 375 (1995).
Alaska. Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform, Inc. v. McAlpine, 810 P.2d 162 (Alaska
1991).
Idaho. The amendment recognizes that the main purpose of punitive damages (deterrence) is destroyed when the wrongdoer dies. The fact that a similar amendment was
not made to the later statute is evidence that the legislature did not intend to allow living wrongdoers to escape the imposition of punitive damages. Gavica v. Hanson, 101
Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980) (overruled on other grounds by, Sterling v. Bloom, 111
Idaho 211.723 I\?d ^ M 1 9 8 6 ) Illinois. Peonle e\ rel. Shrivjt . t viwen. J.b: .l> "'•••'• • i . . . ^ •-•
^etcham
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where the same word •»»• '-T!«- I* used in differeni M •' r m *ev.ii:.i* v\a:
are similar in purpose aiui * >nient
. ; where
•• ATV-J - used
more than uiuv i>, Use same section ''2fi The ^ame r.,.-.. -iaj> hecu applied
even u here the language is only substan1, - !.»• iH Hit r. vords
used in a pri*»t M'tute to express a cenain meaning are omitu-d it will
be presumed thai a change « f meaning was intended 21 Thus it ha ~ been
said ""where a statnk ^ i!! eierence to one subject contain- s given
See City of Buinngton . ; u ;;,vi, J J I I
> i
juugmeni
t )|- •'•* •
modified on other grounds, 471 F.2d 120 (8th C'ir. 1973) ( ' i d u n i ^ i id
i .* in different statutes should be given much the same meaning").
("f. Mate ex rel. American Piam. Co v. Siiprsior Court for King Cou;it\. id* Wash.
676, 17b V

V.T"!"!51'

When Mit)|wi liiatiet ib UilicitiM. >t i •
140 Conn. 650. 103 A.2d 535 (19^4).

-\ .Mi . .._... \

"^ .

25

C.1.K. \ Ridgeway's f.state, Nl 1 ,2u _ . . .. i ;:. :• M„
< <;<> tedieut. Connecticut Light and Power Co. \. Costle, 1 ?> i -Jim. \.:.. -•.. . .._d
1324 • -'S(M; In re Juvenile Appeal (83-< IK ISM Conn. 276, 455 A.2d 1313, 38
A.I .R4ih "36(1983)
Missouri. Citizens naiii- ,i.... ,.:•••
iecun ^i Revenue. State of Mo.. C*9
S.\V.2dxrWMo. 1982).
New Mexico. State \. Johnson, ii4 .N..\.. u t,, lVJi, i JVb -,\MC.%
79 (('t. App. 1W7), cert, denied, 124 N.M. 311, 950 P.2d 284 (1998).
North Dakota Mai,. \ ('onus, 364 N \\ ?.d 88 (N 1 s | <S5,
\doption of Abigail M.. 221 \\ ;^ 2d ^81, 58o N.W.2d21 (Ct. App.
•"< .. ..a. tjiulum \. ialienr. 235 Ga. 47. 218 S.E.2d 799 (197.^).
Kti.hu. K>. Commonwealth \ Hates, 23A K\ 7 6 v 32 S \\'.2d vU (1°30).
27

l'mu-d States. CherlkoiV I;. S., 676 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1982); Hazardous Waste
1 realm* .a ( ouncil v. U.S.h.P.A . 861 F.2d 270 (I).('. Cir. 1988).
Alabama. Kilgore v. Swindle, 219 Ala. ^ 8 . 122 So. 333 (1929).
Califonia. Craven v. Crout, 163 Cal. \- • -.1 "70 ?09 O.i p..,.
1985).
District of Columbia, ^mi'f
Distnci ol ( olumbia Dept. of Employment Ser• v s . 548 \.2d 95 (DC. 19*8 >
Illinois. Lingwall v. lioener, tub ill. 2d2uo, vi in. Dec. 166,483 N.L.2d512( 198°;
In re Marriage of Sutton, 136 111. 2d 441, 145 111. Dec. 890, 557 N.H.2d 869 (!«')(),.
Indiana. Sekerez v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co 166 1nH \nn ^M V ^ ' !: ~><[
521 (3dDist. 1975).
Massachusetts. School Committee of Brockton . leachers' Retirement Bd., 393
Mass. 256, 471 N.E.2d61.21 Ed. Law Rep. 651 (1984); Petrucci \ . Board of Appeals
ofWestwood,45 Maw \ p r C\ «iv ^o? \ : i" ?.! f i l ^ ) review denied 707N.E.2d
1079 (Mass. 1999).
Missouri. State ex rel. Hilbert \ ulaves, 268 Mo U'"--. ^6 S V\ . o85 , ivl6).
However, a provision in one act emitted in another act on the same subject matter,
;
when not inconsisicr
-:>n. •.
n N. ,....:,
... >i> ••'*
-"
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute
manner which reflects the integrity of both. Farmer's Bank of Antonia v. Kostman, 577
S.W.2d 915 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1979).
New York. In re George Ringler & Co., 145 A.D. 361, 130 N.Y.S. 62 (1st Dep't
1911), rev'd on other grounds, 204 N.Y. 30, 97 N.E. 593 (1912).
Ohio. State ex rel. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Tomlinson, 99 Ohio St. 233,
124 N.E. 220 (1919).
Pennsylvania. In re State Highway Route No. 72, 265 Pa. 369, 108 A. 820 (1919);
Com. v. Bigelow, 484 Pa. 476, 399 A.2d 392 (1979).
Where words of a later statute differ from those of a previous one on the same subject,
they presumably are intended to have a different construction. Com. v. Buzak, 197 Pa.
Super. 514, 179 A.2d 248 (1962).
Virginia. Williams v. Matthews, 248 Va. 277, 448 S.E.2d 625 (1994).
Washington. The omission of a similar provision from a similar statute usually
indicates a different legislative intent. Clallam County Deputy Sheriff's Guild v. Board
of Clallam County Com'rs, 92 Wash. 2d 844, 601 P.2d 943 (1979).
West Virginia. Hall v. Baylous, 109 W. Va. 1, 153 S.E. 293, 69 A.L.R. 527 (1930).
Wisconsin. State v. Welkos, 14 Wis. 2d 186, 109 N.W.2d 889 (1961).
But cf. Board of Com'rs of Jackson County v. Branaman, 169 Ind. 80, 82 N.E. 65
(1907); State ex rel. American Piano Co. v. Superior Court for King County, 105
Wash. 676, 178 P. 827(1919).

tion existed".28
§ 51.03 Statutes deemed to be in pari materia
Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when ilu-v : -!.;r-'' !a8

Western States Newspapers, Inc. v. Gehringer, 203 Cal. App. 2d 793, 22 ua;. Rpti.
144(4thDist. 1962).
United States. Water Quality Ass'n Employees' Benefit C~r - rT ^ . nc>5 F.2d
1303 (7th Cir. 1986).
Alabama. House
.;;ii;iai. <. ,;....!._>, yj • :•;.., _a i, J vAla. 1992).
Connecticul. Doe \ Statewide Grievance Committee, 41 Conn. App.;.; i, o, .\ -,..
960 (1996), certification granted in part, 239 Conn. 905, 682 A.2d 999 (1996j and
judgment rev'tl >n Mhor grounds. 240 Conn (.71, 694 A.2d 1218 (1997)
Kansas. Fought \. State. ;4 k.,:: \pp 2-f ' '81 P.2d 742 (1989).
North Dakota. Kroh v. American iamily Ins., 4X7 \ W ^1 W> i\" I
').
Tennessee. State \. Davis, 654 S W.2d 688 (Tenn. C nm. App. 19x3).
Virginia. Williams \ Matthews. 248 Va. 277, 448 S.F.2d 625 (19941
Richards & Stearns, Shareholder By-Laws Requiring Boards ol Dnecn.>i» iv
Dismantle Rights Plans Are Unlikely to Survive Scrutiny Under Delaware Law, 54
Bus Law 607 (1999).
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Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d

THOMSON

584 (U.S.Ky., Jun 12, 1972) (NO. 71-404)

WEST

T H e s e m c \ \ \ m g ce^r-V'mco^e,s p<2,r-Vos\n

on\y t o s e r v i c e ,

OT -\V\Z,

ft ddcLndiAvrs

+o -vV^e, Pe/Y'xVvone.r's R e , p \ y Br\e>^

upon

•vV^ cxcive>rse. p a r t i e s ,
U.S. Postal Service"Delivery Confirmation" Receipt

|
S

u i Postage and Delivery Confirmation fees must be paid before mailing.
in
j - Article Sent To: (to be completed by mailer)
m

PAUL H. MATTHEWS £ ASSOCIATES, P.C., Coun-

O

(Please PrttOeariy)

§ j£ sel to Real Party in Interest, Jennifer
| J Castle, 10 W. Broadway,Suite 700,SaltLake
| a g City,UT84lQl-2060 POSTAL CUSTOMER:
S£

^TMRPTT^

O

or
ru

Keep this receipt. For Inquiries:
Access Internet web site at
www.usps.com ®
or call 1-800-222-1811
CHECK ONE (POSTAL USE ONLY)

m
o
m
a

[ X l Priority Maii™Service
I

I First-Class MaiP parcel

I

I Package Services parcel
(See Reverse)

PS Form 152, May 2002

U.S. Postal Service Delivery Confirmation Receipt
ru Postage and Delivery Confirmation fees must be paid before mailing.
Article Sent To: (to be completed by mailer)

Brent M. Johnson, General Counsel to the
D

I-

^ ru

(Please Print Clearly)

A d m i n i s t r a t i v e O f f ice o f t h e Courts,P.0.
Box 1 4 0 2 4 1 , S a l t Lake C i t y , U T 8 4 1 1 4 - 0 2 4 1

D

i
|°

e ru
m
a
m
a

POSTAL CUSTOMER:
Keep this receipt. For Inquiries:
Access internet web site at
www.usps.com ®
or call 1-800-222-1811
CHECK ONE (POSTAL USE ONLY)

^ P r i o r i t y Maii™Service
I

PS Form 152, May 2002

I Package Services parcel
(See Reverse)

act^cx\ Re,p\y &r\<^T \tse,U V\av\nq

